The Industrial Accelerator Act: a statement for a European industrial strategy

The European Commission’s draft Industrial Accelerator Act (or IAA) marks a turning point in its economic policy, introducing mechanisms to promote ‘Made in the EU’ products and a new requirement for European content.

Presented on 4 March 2026, the Industrial Accelerator Act forms part of the Union’s economic security strategy and aims to strengthen the competitiveness of its industry in the face of international pressures, particularly from the US and China. It sets an ambitious target: to increase the share of the manufacturing sector to 20% of European GDP by 2035, compared with around 14% today. The text prioritises energy-intensive industries, ‘net zero’ technologies and the automotive sector, considered strategic for the green transition and industrial autonomy.

As evidence of Europe’s determination, the IAA takes the form of a regulation, designed to have direct effect across all Member States. It is structured around two strands.

  • A 1st component on this Community preference,which is expressed in two points:
    • The introduction of requirements for European content and low-carbon criteria in public procurement and public support schemes, involving, in certain sectors, compliance with minimum thresholds for local production and, in some cases, making access to public funding conditional on these criteria.
    • Strengthening the framework for foreign direct investment by introducing, for certain strategic sectors, a prior authorisation mechanism.
  • A second part, also comprising two points:
    • A simplification of administrative procedures, in particular by speeding up the process for granting permits for industrial projects;
    • and the establishment of industrial acceleration zones designed to promote the concentration and development of productive activities within the Union.

The introduction of these rules of origin is one of the most innovative elements of the text. Without explicitly enshrining a general principle of European preference, the IAA establishes a set of convergent instruments aimed at directing demand towards products manufactured within the Union.

Many countries have already adopted this national preference (e.g. China in public procurement for hospitals).

The Commission is breaking new ground by extending this concept of European local content to partner countries linked to it by trade agreements. This approach is consistent with the Union’s stated aim of increasing the number of trade agreements and enhancing their attractiveness, whilst respecting its multilateral commitments, particularly within the WTO and under free trade agreements.

Discussions also centre on the scheme’s actual ambition. Whilst the text marks a significant shift in the use of public procurement as an industrial lever, the thresholds adopted and the numerous exceptions provided for, particularly in cases of disproportionate costs or the absence of a suitable tender, could limit its effective scope.

Finally, the IIA introduces greater conditionality for foreign investment, allowing, in certain cases, for the imposition of commitments regarding local content, technology transfer or job creation. This development reflects a tougher European approach to investment screening, with a view to securing value chains.

At this stage, the text is entering the negotiation phase within the European Parliament and the Council, where the key trade-offs between industrial ambition, legal constraints and political balances will be decided. For businesses, the IAA could lead to a significant overhaul of strategies for procurement, investment and access to public procurement, within a rapidly changing legal environment.

This text perfectly illustrates Europe’s awakening to what are deemed unfair competitive practices and structural imbalances in international trade.

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