I. Gradual development of a legal defence arsenal against proceedings initiated abroad
Russia has turned its courts into a tool for exerting pressure on European operators striving to comply with sanctions. Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Arbitration Procedure Code allow Russian courts to assert exclusive jurisdiction in disputes involving sanctioned parties, even in the presence of jurisdiction or arbitration clauses designating a foreign forum. The judgments thus obtained are then enforced by Russian claimants in cooperative third countries, which in practice neutralizes the refusal of recognition by European courts themselves.
In response to this strategy, the European Union has developed a framework aimed at neutralizing the effects of foreign judgments, redressing the harm suffered by European operators, and extending restrictive measures to actors who abuse these national procedures to their detriment.
The 20th package of April 23, 2026, granted the courts of Member States the power to issue anti-suit injunctions, ordering a Russian party to refrain from initiating or to terminate proceedings that violate a jurisdiction clause, under penalty of financial sanctions. The 21st package adds a second tool: European courts may now issue anti-enforcement injunctions, prohibiting a party from seeking to have recognized, enforced, or relied upon a decision obtained in Russia on the basis of Russian countermeasures, in particular the aforementioned Articles 248.1 and 248.2, or in violation of European measures. This mechanism, borrowed from common law, is supported by a mechanism more typical of civil law systems: Member States are now required not to recognize or enforce Russian decisions rendered on this same basis against European operators. The obligation of non-recognition thus applies regardless of any request by the aggrieved party.
This obligation complements the so-called “non-enforcement clause” set forth in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014: the courts of Member States have long been prohibited from granting claims related to a contract or transaction whose performance has been affected by the restrictive measures, when such claims are brought by companies established in Russia, owned by them, or any company established in a third country.
At the same time, Article 11a of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, introduced by the 14th package, grants European operators the right to seek compensation before the courts of Member States for direct and indirect damages suffered as a result of proceedings initiated in Russia or in third countries in connection with the application of sanctions. The 21st package extends the scope to two scenarios previously not covered: first, legal actions brought by non-Russian and non-Belarusian individuals before courts in third countries as a result of compliance with European sanctions; and second, judicial decisions rendered following the suspension or termination of a contract on the grounds of compliance with sanctions. The mechanism thus adapts to the shift in litigation, which no longer takes place solely in Russian courts.
Finally, the framework extends to sanctioning the actors themselves. In particular, the 20th package created two new annexes to Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, which allow prohibiting transactions with entities that exploit, without authorization, intellectual property rights belonging to European groups, as well as with individuals who seek to enforce, in third countries, Russian court decisions based on claims arising from abusive proceedings. The regulation directly targets actors who exploit Russian domestic proceedings or infringe upon the intellectual property rights of European operators, and it also establishes a notification obligation to the competent authorities of Member States, intended to inform future designations.
II. Gradual affirmation of the extraterritoriality of European sanctions
The extraterritoriality of European sanctions has been gradually affirmed through an increasing number of direct designations of third-country operators and by imposing due diligence obligations on European operators in their capacity as parent companies, or as sellers or exporters of high-priority goods.
The first step was to establish the possibility of blacklisting entities that facilitate violations of the prohibition on circumventing Regulations 269/2014, 833/2014, or 2022/263, or that significantly undermine the restrictive measures imposed against Russia. This ground is set forth in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014, which lists the criteria for inclusion on this list. This wording, reminiscent of the U.S. secondary sanctions mechanism, makes it possible to target third-country operators who, by hypothesis, are not subject to any direct obligation under EU law, but whose conduct allows them to be treated in the same manner as Russian companies because of their contribution to the war effort.
Subsequently, the 14th package of June 24, 2024, introduced a new form of extraterritoriality for the measures, which is not intended to expand the list of potentially sanctioned persons, but rather to broaden the scope of legal entities subject to the restrictive measures. This “best efforts” obligation, established in Article 8a of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, requires European natural and legal persons, entities, and bodies to use their best efforts to ensure that the foreign entities they own or control comply with the sanctions. This obligation has the effect of making European companies responsible for, and guarantors of, the compliance of their foreign subsidiaries. This measure is all the more significant given that the failure to implement compliance and oversight policies may give rise to criminal liability for the parent company, regardless of any direct or indirect involvement by the parent company in the prohibited transaction itself.
The contractual obligations associated with the sale and export of high-priority common goods listed in Annex XL are also among these hybrid extraterritorial provisions. Pursuant to Article 12g of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, a European exporter must include in its contracts with a third-country partner a clause prohibiting re-export to Russia, accompanied by adequate remedial mechanisms in the event of a breach and an obligation to notify the competent authorities. This mechanism requires the European operator to carry the prohibition into the contract, thereby passing it down the commercial chain to actors that EU law does not reach directly. Here again, in contractual form, is the extension of compliance with restrictive measures, given the impossibility of taking legal action against actors established in third countries. A similar mechanism exists for transfers of intellectual property rights relating to these same priority goods.
III. Shift toward an expanded export control regime
Annex IV of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, adopted in 2022, already constituted an embryonic form of individualized export control, largely inspired by the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. It prohibits the sale, supply, transfer, or export, to the persons and entities specifically named therein, of dual-use goods, military goods, as well as the advanced goods and technologies listed in Annex VII, which are sufficiently sensitive to warrant a separate category.
The increasing number of these listings in Annex IV, like the rise in entity designations under Regulation 269/2014, indicates quite clearly where the priority now lies: no longer in expanding the list of prohibited goods, which is now largely stabilized, but in closing off circumvention routes. The centre of gravity of the regime has shifted from the product to the trade route.
Annex VII deserves particular attention in this respect, as it has, since 2022, served as a valuable testing ground for reflection on how the export control regime for dual-use goods and technologies might evolve. This summer, the EU launched a consultation inviting business circles and non-governmental stakeholders to propose ways to improve or amend Regulation 2021/821, the scope of whose recast is not yet the subject of consensus within the Council. In practice, the annexes to the sanctions regulations, more flexible to handle because less subject to the EU’s international commitments, offer potential avenues. The aeronautical and electronic equipment, sensors, lasers, chemical precursors, and machine tools covered by Annex VII share the common feature of not being covered by multilateral control lists. The experience gained in drawing up this list, within the framework of the sanctions regime targeting Russia and Belarus, could thus provide the empirical basis for a lasting expansion of the goods covered by Regulation (EU) 2021/821, detached from any sanctions regime, should the EU choose to do so.
Lastly, the European Union is reaffirming an increasingly uncompromising extraterritorial stance toward circumvention routes, moving from prohibitions based on individual designations to blanket export bans or targeted transaction bans with accommodating third countries. The 20th package thus activated the anti-circumvention tool provided for in Article 12f of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 to prohibit all exports to Kyrgyzstan of numerically controlled machine tools and telecommunications equipment. The 21st package applies this same logic to the crypto-asset sector: the new Article 5b(4) of Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 now authorizes the Council to prohibit any transaction with crypto-asset service providers established in a third country listed in a dedicated annex, provided that country has systematically failed to prevent the circumvention of sanctions. This annex remains empty to date, but the legal basis has been laid to extend to entire jurisdictions a logic previously reserved for specifically identified operators.