EU sanctions and asset freezes: the concept of “control”, between statutory definition and the responsibility of businesses

On 12 October 2026, the Council of the European Union added 1,646 individuals and entities to Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the largest round of designations ever made under this regime. Its impact reaches well beyond those listed: it extends to every entity they own, hold or control. Yet the concept of “control”, which for years was addressed only in Council and Commission guidance, has changed considerably over the past year, now that the Regulation contains a definition and the Court of Justice has handed down a series of judgments clarifying both its reach and its limits.

On 12 October 2026, the European Union announced a new round of designations under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014, which lists the individuals and legal persons whose funds and economic resources are frozen. Through Decision (CFSP) 2026/2279 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2281, the Council listed 1,569 individuals and entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex. A further 77 individuals were designated the same day for their role in the so-called “elections” held in the occupied territories of Ukraine[1]. This round, which brings the total number of persons and entities listed under the regime to almost 4,600, is so large that it is sometimes described as a “22nd sanctions package”, even though it was adopted outside the usual cycle of sectoral packages.

To identify the companies concerned, the Council relied on a list published by the Russian government of businesses eligible for state subsidies, and therefore presumed to form part of Russia’s military-industrial complex. Although the EU’s stated priority is the supply chain for ballistic missiles, many of the companies designated are in fact suppliers of intermediate products, such as electronic components, communications systems or optical equipment, and also have civilian activities[2].

EU-based businesses will need to take a fresh, comprehensive look at how these measures affect their commercial relationships, whether with customers, suppliers, intermediaries or financial partners. But the designations also make it necessary to revisit the concept of control. Under Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014, all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the persons listed in Annex I must be frozen, and no funds or economic resources may be made available to them, or for their benefit, whether directly or indirectly. These obligations also cover the companies that listed persons own or control. In practice, then, the designations reach far beyond the names published in the Official Journal, extending to subsidiaries, shareholdings and joint ventures, both inside and outside the EU.

I. From administrative practice to a statutory definition

As originally drafted, Regulation No 269/2014 used two criteria to determine the scope of the asset freeze and of the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available. The first was personal: it extended the measures to individuals, legal persons, entities and bodies “associated” with designated persons. This rather ambiguous criterion was later removed. The second was material: it required the freezing of funds owned, held or controlled by designated persons. Its corollary was a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to anyone who would use them to generate profits for the listed individuals or legal persons.

The scope of these measures was then refined through non-binding instruments, notably the Council’s Best Practices, under which a listed person is regarded as owning an entity if it holds 50% or more of its proprietary rights or a majority interest in it. The test is similar to, but not the same as, the “50% rule” under US law, which can cause confusion for multinational groups seeking to apply a single compliance programme across their operations. Where the ownership threshold is not met, the control test applies instead: a list of indicators gives rise to a presumption of control, which can be rebutted on a case-by-case basis[3]. The European Commission, for its part, considers that control exists where a person is in a position to exercise, and actually exercises, decisive influence over an entity’s conduct[4]. Once control is established, it is presumed to extend to all assets nominally held by the controlled entity and to its subsidiaries, wherever they are located[5].

Regulation (EU) 2025/2037 of 23 October 2025, adopted as part of the 19th sanctions package[6], resolved this by inserting into Article 1 of Regulation No 269/2014 two definitions modelled on those in Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on combating terrorism[7]. A legal person, entity or body is now “owned” by a person who holds 50% or more of its proprietary rights or a majority interest in it. “Control” includes, among other things: the right or power to appoint or remove a majority of the members of its administrative, management or supervisory body; sole control, under an agreement with other shareholders or members, of a majority of the voting rights; the right to exercise a dominant influence under an agreement or the articles of association; the power to exercise such dominant influence de facto, without holding the corresponding right; the right to use all or part of its assets; managing it on a unified basis while publishing consolidated accounts; and sharing its financial liabilities jointly and severally, or guaranteeing them.

These definitions largely mirror the criteria in the Best Practices. The list of control situations is not exhaustive, however, and the reference to de facto dominant influence means that informal control can be captured in all its forms. The reference to “associated” persons, which had given rise to uncertainty about its scope, has also been removed from Article 2. Ownership, holding and control are therefore now the only criteria that determine the scope of the freeze, and they operate at two levels: the freeze covers the funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by a listed person, and also all the assets of any entity that person owns or controls.

II. Assessing ownership and control: a burden that falls on businesses

Since no list can be drawn up of the entities owned or controlled by designated persons, the effectiveness of asset freezes depends largely on the analysis carried out by EU businesses themselves, which must look beyond the published names to identify the companies that listed persons own or control. The Commission has made clear that the obligation to freeze, and the prohibition on making economic resources available, apply as soon as there are reasonable grounds to believe that assets are owned or controlled by a listed person[8].

The rules therefore have to strike a balance. On one side are decisions to freeze funds or refuse transactions; on the other, the need for restrictive measures to be applied fairly and consistently, which is ensured by requiring compliance decisions to be reasoned and by allowing the positions taken by businesses to be challenged. The Court of Justice has endorsed this balance: a freeze may be imposed without first hearing the entity concerned, so as to preserve the element of surprise, but the reasons must be communicated to it as soon as possible[9]. The EM System judgment of 12 March 2026 goes further still[10]: an entity whose funds are frozen because they are said to be held or controlled by a listed person must be told why, even where the freeze results from a bank’s own assessment, and must be able to challenge it before the national authority and, if necessary, the courts, by showing that, given its governance structure, its articles of association and how it actually operates, the listed person does not in fact hold or control its funds. The Court has also made clear that control must be established on an objective and sufficiently solid basis, through direct evidence or a body of sufficiently specific and consistent indicia. Thus, while it declined to treat a company ultimately owned by a Russian state-controlled undertaking as controlled by the President of the Russian Federation merely because of the autocratic and oligarchic nature of the Russian regime[11], it upheld the freezing of assets held in trust where, regardless of the terms of the trust deed and the law governing the trust, the designated person continues to benefit from them in practice, for instance through powers reserved as settlor, the power to appoint or remove the trustee or protector, or close ties with them[12].

In practice, unfreezing funds or obtaining authorisation for a transaction involves dialogue with the competent national authority (in France, the Directorate General of the Treasury), under procedures that vary from one Member State to another. The non-listed entity must then rebut the presumption of control by showing that, despite a majority ownership chain for example, its funds do not benefit the sanctioned individual or parent company. This usually depends on putting in place safeguards, known as “firewalls”, which permanently insulate the entity from the listed person. These may include removing directors with links to the designated person, a commitment by the management bodies not to act on that person’s instructions, a bar on paying dividends for that person’s benefit, or regular review of the accounts and decisions by an independent auditor or director. Firewalls may be imposed by law or by a judicial or administrative decision, or set up by the entity itself, and the national authority may authorise the transactions needed to implement them under Article 6b(5d) of Regulation No 269/2014[13]. Whether a firewall is accepted, however, remains a matter for each national authority.

Efforts to rebut the presumption when transactions are refused generally come up against two forms of “over-compliance”. The first is wrongly extending sanctions to non-listed companies because one of their directors or senior managers has been designated. Such a person may well have decision-making powers over the company’s strategy and business, but that influence is in principle confined to running its operations and does not translate into any personal benefit from the company’s funds. The second is reading too much into the notion of resources being generated “for the benefit” of a listed person who is only a minority shareholder. Administrative practice is settled on this point, since contributing to a company’s business, even where this may affect the dividends paid to a listed shareholder, does not amount to prohibited indirect making available of funds.

Finally, joint ventures are on the rise, whether to avoid displaying overly close ties with listed entities or to create, rightly or wrongly, a degree of separation from them. They call for closer scrutiny of the ownership structures presented by business partners, and for businesses to bear in mind the Commission’s position that holdings by several listed persons must be aggregated[14]. A company owned, directly or indirectly, by three listed companies each holding 20% of its capital should therefore, in principle, be treated as owned by listed persons, and its assets frozen. Given the number of companies designated on 12 October, many of which belong to the same industrial groups, this aggregation risk is likely to arise more often than in the past.

In conclusion, screening counterparties against the published lists is no longer enough. Businesses increasingly need to map the ownership of their customers, suppliers and partners beyond the first tier, and sometimes beyond the second, aggregating holdings by listed persons and watching for de facto control, particularly in the sectors targeted by the designations of 12 October 2026. They should also keep a record of the reasons for each transaction refused and each freeze applied, so that they can justify their decisions to the entity concerned, the national authority or the courts.

[1] Council of the EU, press release of 12 October 2026; Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2279 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2281 of 12 October 2026; Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2291 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2292 of the same day;

[2] Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2281 of 12 October 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, recital 5;

[3] Council of the EU, EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures, doc. 11623/24 of 3 July 2024, paragraphs 62 to 70;

[4] European Commission, Opinion of 19 June 2020, C(2020) 4117, pp. 2-3, and Opinion of 8 June 2021, C(2021) 4223, pp. 2-3, referring to the answer to question 9 of the Commission’s FAQs on restrictive measures against Syria (2017);

[5] European Commission, Opinion of 19 June 2020 on Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, C(2020) 4117; Opinion of 8 June 2021 on Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, C(2021) 4223;

[6] Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2036 and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2037 of 23 October 2025;

[7] Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2037 of 23 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, recital 6 and Article 1, points (1) and (2);

[8] Consolidated FAQs, section B.1, question 13; the Commission also states that there is no list of the holdings of designated persons, this task falling to compliance functions (question 3);

[9] CJEU, 3 September 2026, Inter Rao Lietuva, Case C-147/25, press release No 116/26;

[10] CJEU, 12 March 2026, EM System, Case C-84/24, delivered under Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 (Belarus) and cited by the Commission for the application of Regulation No 269/2014 (Consolidated FAQs, section B.1, question 2);

[11] CJEU, 3 September 2026, Inter Rao Lietuva, Case C-147/25;

[12] CJEU, 21 May 2026, T Trust, Case C-483/23, EU:C:2026:408; CJEU, 21 May 2026, FZ AR and SX, Joined Cases C-428/24 and C-476/24, EU:C:2026:409;

[13] Derogation introduced by Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1215 of 23 June 2023; see also the Commission’s guidance note of 29 November 2023 on firewalls and the Consolidated FAQs, section B.1, questions 44 to 46;

[14] Consolidated FAQs, section B.1, question 8; Best Practices, paragraph 63.

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