The General Court provides important clarifications on the notions of assembly and completion operations in the context of anti‑dumping circumvention

By annulling the extension of an anti‑dumping duty to Türkiye, the General Court of the European Union has tightened the interpretation of the circumvention mechanisms laid down in Article 13 of the Basic Regulation. In clarifying what does — and does not — constitute an assembly or completion operation, the Court has reminded the Commission of the legal limits governing its action.

The Çolakoğlu Metalurji judgment, delivered by the General Court of the European Union(1), is a significant decision in anti‑dumping litigation, as it clarifies the scope of the notions of “assembly operation” and “completion operation” within the meaning of Article 13 of the Basic Regulation(2). By annulling the extension of an anti‑dumping duty to Türkiye on the grounds that the Commission had distorted these two concepts, the Court reiterates the requirements of precision and proportionality that must guide the Union’s action in combating circumvention. While this decision strengthens legal certainty for economic operators, it nevertheless raises questions about the Union’s ability to respond effectively to increasingly sophisticated industrial strategies.

1. A welcome clarification of the notions of assembly and completion

Article 13 of the Basic Anti‑Dumping Regulation provides that circumvention occurs where the parts originating in the country concerned do not account for more than 60% of the total value of the parts of the product, unless the value added to the incorporated parts during the assembly or completion operation exceeds 25% of the manufacturing cost.

The main contribution of the Çolakoğlu Metalurji judgment lies in the clear distinction drawn by the Court between industrial processing and assembly. The Commission had considered that the processing in Türkiye of hot‑rolled steel coils from slabs imported from Indonesia—representing nearly 100% of the total value of the parts of the final product—constituted an assembly operation, thereby justifying the extension of the anti‑dumping duty (in this case, the value added to the incorporated parts during the assembly or completion operation was below 25% of the manufacturing cost).

The Court rejects this interpretation, recalling that assembly presupposes the bringing together of several distinct components, which is clearly not the case when a single input is transformed through a complex metallurgical process.

Similarly, the Court refuses to classify the heavy processing of a slab into a finished product as a “completion operation”. This notion refers to final, ancillary or marginal operations, not to a full industrial process. Once again, the Commission had attempted to broaden the scope of the text in order to pursue a legitimate policy objective—combating circumvention—but at the cost of conceptual distortion.

The parallel drawn by the Commission with the PGTEX Morocco(3) judgment was also unsuccessful. In that case, the Court had likewise adopted a strict interpretation of the circumvention rules, refusing to recognise a transformation as sufficient to confer a new origin.

In PGTEX Morocco, the Commission found that the company purchased 100% of the glass‑fibre rovings it used from its parent company in China. These rovings were transformed into woven and/or stitched glass‑fibre fabrics (GFF) through a stitch‑bonding process, which constitutes a completion operation carried out in Morocco. The Commission concluded that they accounted for nearly 100% of the total value of the parts of the assembled/completed product within the meaning of Article 13 of the Basic Regulation. As the 60% criterion was met, the Commission then examined whether the value added locally exceeded the 25% threshold, which was not the case.

The Court nevertheless recalls that in PGTEX Morocco it did not rule on whether the notion of completion could also cover the processing of a single input involving no assembly, because in any event the stitch‑bonding process involves assembling several glass‑fibre rovings—i.e. “a form of assembly”.

The two judgments thus share a common philosophy: the technical notions of customs and anti‑dumping law must be applied strictly, without artificial extension. However, the stakes differ. In PGTEX Morocco, strictness protects the integrity of tariff preferences; in Çolakoğlu Metalurji, it limits the scope of anti‑dumping measures. In both cases, the Court reminds the Commission that it cannot reshape legal concepts to achieve an economic objective, however legitimate.

2. A warning against the Commission’s expansive interpretations

The judgment forms part of a consistent line of case‑law: the Union courts ensure that the Commission does not use anti‑circumvention mechanisms as instruments of general trade policy. Article 13 of the Basic Regulation is an exception, allowing the extension of an anti‑dumping duty to products not originally covered. As with any exception, it must be interpreted strictly.

By reiterating this requirement, the Court protects operators against extensions of duties based on overly broad reasoning or insufficiently substantiated economic presumptions.

However, this approach may be seen as hindering the effectiveness of the Union’s trade policy. Circumvention strategies evolve rapidly, and certain industrial operations—although technically far removed from assembly—may nevertheless have the economic purpose of avoiding duties. By imposing a strict reading of legal categories, the Court limits the Commission’s room for manoeuvre in addressing such practices.

The judgment undeniably enhances legal certainty. Operators now know that the transformation of a single input into a finished product cannot be regarded as either assembly or completion. This predictability is essential in an industrial sector characterised by heavy investment and complex value chains.

Nevertheless, this clarification highlights a structural tension in anti‑dumping law: how can stable legal concepts be reconciled with the need to adapt to evolving industrial practices?

Ultimately, the judgment illustrates the permanent tension between economic effectiveness and legal precision. The Court clearly opts for the latter, even at the risk of forcing the Commission to rethink its tools or seek an amendment to the regulatory framework.

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  1. General Court, 4 March 2026, Çolakoğlu Metalurji v Commission, Case T‑379/23.  
  2. Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union.  
  3. General Court, 4 Dec. 2024, PGTEX Morocco v Commission, Cases T-245/22 and T-246/22.

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